Class and Values in Postsocialist Transformation in Serbia

ABSTRACT: Circumstances such as the blocked transition in Serbia during the 1990s—with the prolonged political and economic domination of former nomenklatura members, the economic collapse of the country and massive pauperization of the population, external isolation, and so on—may result in the perseverance of old values among many social groups whose position has thus been extremely worsened. In this case, a gap between new norms and old values may be created, which we call value/normative dissonance. This gap is likely to cause a strong inter- and intraclass value inconsistency.

In this article, we analyze the spread of dominant value orientations among social classes in the present postsocialist system in Serbia. The analysis is based on the data obtained in the South-East European Social Survey Project (SEESSP) in which 2,997 respondents participated in December 2003/January 2004. We analyze the spread of two pairs of conflicting value orientations: (1) political liberalism vs. authoritarian collectivism, and (2) market liberalism vs. redistributive statism. We also check intraclass value consistency. The influence of possible normative/value dissonance upon the democratization and market transformation of Serbia is evaluated. We compare the results of our analysis with the findings of an analysis of data obtained in an earlier survey, Change in Class Structure and...
Mobility in Serbia,” in which 3,660 respondents participated in 1989.

Our decision to deal with the two value orientations mentioned above was based on a factor analysis of a number of statements hypothetically related to different value systems and was confirmed by principal components analysis (PCA). Based on these results, we form scales to represent political and market liberalism, on one side, and authoritarian, redistributive statism, on the other. In the third step, we use analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the scale scores to describe value consistency among and within the social classes.

This article deals with the changes (or survival!) of certain basic value orientations in Serbian society during the period of unblocked, delayed postsocialist transformation. The postsocialist transformation in Serbia has had a long and remarkably uneven course, marked by historical specifics that substantially distinguish it from comparable changes in, for example, the Czech Republic, Poland, or Hungary. This process may, in principle, be divided into two periods: the first, which lasted from 1989 until the late 1990s we call “blocked transformation” (cf. Lazić 2000a); and the second, which gained momentum after the downfall of the Milošević regime in 2000 may be defined as “unblocked transformation” (Lazić and Cvejić 2005). The specific characteristics of this process are revealed in all social subsystems—economic, political, societal, and cultural—which means that the formation of new class relations in Serbia (elite recruitment patterns, establishment of new forms and proportions of economic inequalities, formation of value patterns, resistance to change, etc.) were also subjected to specific rules (Lazić and Cvejić 2005: 40).

As Inglehart (1997: 167) notes, literature on “transition” often focuses on the elites, since they play the central role in the events that most conspicuously mark the process of change. But the issue of legitimacy of the new social order draws attention to substantially slower, cultural changes, which are no less important because they form the basis of the new social consensus upon which this legitimacy rests (Parsons 1969: 43). The adoption of a new value system by the majority in a society, primarily by the members of its elite, is a condition for the constitution of stable institutions through which the new system of social relations is reproduced. In this way, the value system provides the basis of loyalty to the given economic and political system (Inglehart 1997: 52).

Conceptual Framework: Normative-Value Dissonance

It is well known in social theory that people’s actions are determined, on the one hand, by the norms that derive from fundamental relations in the social systems (referred to here as the dominant social context for short) and, on the other, by value patterns, which are a product of the twofold influence of historical factors and the given system of relations (Lazić 2003). Under the circumstances of a stable reproduction of the social system, norms and values are permanently mutually adjusted in that the norms set the framework for defining what individuals and social groups
consider of value, while internalized values help to sustain the normative system and thereby also the dominant social context. “Consistency” between the norms and values (to the extent that individuals as well as entire social groups consider desirable precisely the type of actions, their objectives, etc., that derive from the given normative system) is indispensable for the unobstructed reproduction of a given system of social relations. Or, as it has been stressed in manuals, “a cultural system generates complex pressures toward consistency among its beliefs, values and norms” (IESS, vol. 11: 206)

However, maintaining an overall harmony between norms and values becomes rather difficult in a situation that involves the radical change of the dominant social context, when new forms of basic social relations are established, and therefore also a new normative system. In this “transitory” period, when the new normative system becomes dominant (as an element of new institutional arrangements), although some elements of the old order are still retained, the same duality also appears in the sphere of values, and—since values, in addition to the system, also have a cultural-historical base—persists remarkably longer. The parallel existence of the new dominant and the old normative systems as well as of the new and old value orientations may result in a situation where large numbers of individuals acting within one of the normative systems retain (or adopt) some value orientations that contravene it. This contrariety is referred to as the normative-value dissonance. Thus, it appears when the social order, primarily through its normative system, faces active individuals with requirements that are disharmonious or that conflict with the value patterns these individuals have adopted (Lazić 2003). Furthermore, under historical conditions wherein the entire dominant system of social relations is changed, the normative-value dissonance may appear at the level of entire social groups, especially those whose position is substantially endangered by the ongoing systemic social changes.

In cases of the clear predominance of new norms, this dissonance may be resolved (to put it in simplified terms) in two ways. An individual (or group) who seeks to be successful in the given environment shall attempt to adjust his/her actions to the systemic requirements (norms) that will, in time, lead to changes in his/her value patterns and their adjustment with the normative system. By contrast, the actions of an individual who retains the old value patterns shall be ineffective in the given environment (entrepreneurial failure, lack of advancement in career, loss of job, etc.). Over time, these two mechanisms will gradually lead to the removal of the normative-value dissonance as a wider social phenomenon. But, in historical circumstances where the new social relations—institutional arrangements, norms, and so on—fail to impose themselves as dominant and the old normative patterns are, in parallel, retained on a wider basis, the dissonance becomes pronounced and obtains not only individual but also group character, and, by conditioning individual and collective actions that interfere with the establishment of new relations, may block the process of social changes on a more lasting basis. A notable historical example, demonstrating interdependence between (late) socioeconomic
modernization, political conservatism, and social conflicts, is seen in the case of Prussia—and later, of unified Germany—where the dominant sociopolitical position of big landowners significantly delayed political modernization (democratization), with all of the other global historical consequences (see Moore 1966; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975).

Precisely these social and historical circumstances, where the old type of social relations offered prolonged opposition to the establishment of the new social order, that is, where two institutional and normative systems functioned simultaneously (in parallel), characterized the situation in Serbia during its postsocialist transformation at the end of the twentieth century. On the one hand, there was a strong presence of distributive social norms, formed in the previous command socialist economy, but also structurally homologous to the premarket, agrarian, self-sufficient economy largely retained in Serbia until the beginning of World War II. On the other hand, there was also the increasingly stronger effect of the norms that took shape with the rapidly expanding market forms of economic relations (established internally, in the process of social transformation; imposed externally by the dominant capitalist environment; and also to a certain extent already existent in the previous, specific Yugoslav “market socialism”). In the same vein, the sphere of values comprised collective patterns (resulting from combinations of traditional, patriarchal, and socialist egalitarian legacies), as well as individualist patterns, themselves a product of multiple influences: (quasi)modernization of the socialist period (especially urbanization and expansion of the education system), decades-long openness of the country toward the West, and the current processes of social transformation.

It is quite clear that these circumstances give rise to two problems. First, by crossing the two pairs of norm and value systems (naturally, we have in mind the “ideal-typical” structure)—within the given “social context” where mutually conflicting normative systems and value patterns are at work—only two combinations so obtained are not contradictory, while the other two lead to a pronounced internal conflict. However, more important for us, for the time being, is the fact that the prolonged survival of a powerful command socialist normative-value block encourages the persistence of a remarkable dissonance between the new (market–liberal–pluralistic) norms and widespread value orientations, and in this way slows down the transformation process in Serbia for a longer period of time. In the empirical sphere this situation is revealed in manifest value confusion at both the individual and group (class) levels.

Historical Framework for the Study of Value Changes in Serbia

The actual historical course that brought about the blocking of the transformation along with the establishment and protracted existence of a normative-value dualism, as well as a pronounced normative-value dissonance, cannot be addressed here in great detail (for more on this, see Lazić [2000a]). In brief, what lies at the
basis of the transformation course that has formed is the aspiration of the emerging political and economic elite, formed predominantly by the members of the ruling nomenklatura in the socialist period, to adapt the inevitable changes caused by the collapse of the socialist order in Central and Eastern Europe to its own interests. To ensure the appropriate legitimacy basis, the social elite has the possibility to adjust to the dominant normative-value patterns as well as to change them to suit its own interests (Inglehart 1997: 53). The process of establishing new normative-value patterns on the part of the new/old elite in Serbia was specific for two reasons, both of which are linked with the course of previous historical developments. First, the shedding of egalitarian and collectivist value patterns was more difficult in Serbia than in the Central European states because autochtonously formed socialism in this country (and Yugoslavia in general) had a much more liberal nature (including the formation of the self-management system and ideology) than in the above-mentioned states, and, moreover, was not symbolically linked with the direct intervention of a foreign power (the Soviet Union) as was the case in the Czech Republic, Poland, or Hungary, but rather with the resistance to its attempts at domination (Lazić and Cvejić 2005: 41–42). Second, the structural remains of the premodernizing period (a large stratum of the farmers and majority of the rural population) in Serbia represented the basis for the preservation of traditional value patterns, while the incomplete process of national state formation of most ethnic groups composing the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the interests of national elites leading its member republics created favorable conditions for the burgeoning of nationalism (Massey, Hodson, and Sekulić 1994). For these reasons, during the 1990s, the breakthrough of liberal and democratic values slowed down and most of the political, economic, and cultural elite imposed egalitarianism, traditionalism, and nationalism as the dominant legitimacy framework.

Conversion of the previous (socialist) command positions into economic capital by the members of the former nomenklatura in Serbia was completed by the second half of the 1990s (cf. Lazić 2000b), and the new economic elite developed an interest in the “normalization” of the social order and the creation of regular market economic conditions wherein their newly acquired capital could be safely invested and yield legitimate profits. However, it soon turned out that the existing political regime could not ensure stable conditions for the reproduction of new social relations, which is why the economic elite withheld its backing of Milošević and supported the change of power in 2000 (Lazić and Cvejić 2005: 44). Thus, after 2000, the systematic formation of a new normative order enabled the stabilization of the market economy along with the affirmation of political democracy and civic freedoms. However, due to the previous course of developments, the new normative and value forms took hold unevenly and disparately. On the one hand, the interests of the new economic elite and parts of other social groups (political elite, professionals, small entrepreneurs) as well as the pressures of international
institutions and the developed countries influence the imposition of new norms of behavior and modern forms of integration (namely, relations characteristic of a market economy, political pluralism, and civil society). On the other hand, the interests of the losers in the transformation process (manual workers, farmers, pensioners, lower state officials) and part of the political elite make the formation of new institutions difficult and encourage the preservation/renewal of normative and value patterns dominant during the 1990s, all of which largely slows down the unblocking of the transformation.

The above-mentioned social processes and their consequences in the normative sphere enabled the survival of a remarkably inconsistent mixture of values in Serbia, which was already observed in the surveys done during the socialist period. This mixture revealed not only the existence of widespread traditional (mainly patriarchal) values, elements of strong authoritarian forms of consciousness as well as collectivist ideology, but also self-management consciousness, which supported “modernism . . . openness to the world, material and non-egalitarian orientation” (Pantić 1977: 294). There was a clear structural link between traditionalism, authoritarianism, and collectivist and egalitarian socialist values, but the patterns of “self-management” consciousness were at odds with them. Furthermore, several surveys also found a relatively low level of nationalism among the population (even if strong nationalistic movements did appear among the Albanians in Kosovo during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s; in Croatia in the late 1960s and early 1970s, etc.; see Ramet 1992).

As it is well known that the late 1980s in Serbia were marked by abruptly increasing nationalist mobilization of the Serbian nation, initially spurred by the political and cultural elites (conflicting with the elites in other federal republics) on the basis of prolonged ethnic conflicts in Kosovo (Dragović-Soso 2004). Following action-and-reaction logic, this mobilization then spread among all ethnic groups throughout the former Yugoslavia. At the very time when nationalism became the dominant value orientation in these areas, the socialist order in Eastern Europe broke down, resulting in the retreat of collectivist socialist values and their substitution with liberal values in all other European postsocialist countries (cf. Inglehart et al. 1998). As was already noted, the members of the socialist nomenklatura in Serbia, having previously secured mass popular support for their nationalist program, remained in power even after the change of regimes in all other formerly Yugoslav republics. However, exposed to more external than internal pressure, the Milošević regime was also forced to gradually make a number of systemic changes, related in the first place to the introduction of political pluralism and the removal of legal obstacles to private ownership in the economy (with market economy expansion). In view of such changes—where elements of the old system of social regulation were preserved while certain forms of the new one emerged—Serbia was characterized by the existence of several antagonistic value patterns: socialist (command-
collectivistic values as well as “self-managerial” consciousness); traditionalist and authoritarian; nationalistic; but also liberalist (cf. Gredelj 1995). The blocked transformation during the 1990s (with its contradictory characteristics—slow and controlled systemic changes, economic breakdown, etc.) along with four-year civil wars, followed by conflicts in Kosovo, and, finally, the war against NATO countries in 1999, provided the grounds for preservation of this confused amalgam of different and even conflicting value patterns. In that light, it is clear that in the relatively short period of three years (until the time of the most recent survey this article draws upon for relevant data) after the deposing of the old regime and the consequent more resolute attempts to unblock the postsocialist transformation process, significant changes in the value patterns of the population could not have taken place (especially in view of two crucial facts: the still outstanding problem of the Serbian national issue due to the unresolved status of Kosovo; and the accelerated market transformation of the economy—after a long period of dramatic crisis—with its usual consequences such as transitional recession, increased unemployment, growing social differentiation, etc.).

In other words, the transformation difficulties, which are still quite prominent in Serbia, are the consequence of the fact that the factors leading to normative-value dissonance are still very firm. Many enterprises in Serbia with a large number of employees are still in the form of a collective ownership (state or social) and the privatization process is developing at a relatively slow pace because, after a decade of wars, economic, and political crises, society is too exhausted to sustain more rapid change (which would be conducive to a further increase in unemployment, differentiation of earnings, and other well-known consequences of economic restructuring). In these enterprises, elements of a distributive economy are retained (large transfers from the state budget), creating the illusion among the employees of these enterprises as well as others that it would be possible to preserve the old normative system for a longer time, which consequently enables the retention of old value patterns.  

Research Data and Methodology

The 2003/4 survey devotes significant attention to the study of values. The initial results of the analyses of class value orientations in Serbia, comparing the end of the socialist period (1989) and the years of unblocked transformation are presented in our 2004 <<s/b 2005? or else supply additional reference>> study. It analyzes the spread of four value orientations: traditionalism, authoritarianism, nationalism, and liberalism, using the respondents’ answers to three questions for each. The results of this analysis reveal that ambivalent processes of value orientation formation are still characteristic of Serbia: a gradual decrease in traditionalism and authoritarianism along with the retention of nationalistic and confused liberal value orientations by a substantial part of the population (Lazić and Cvejić 2005: 67). The presence of nationalistic orientations and ambivalence toward liberal values
primarily—but not exclusively—among the lower classes provides the basis for the survival of a part of the political elite that opposes the transformation (the actions of which help sustain these orientations). Furthermore, this provides a favorable framework for mass mobilization of various political paradigms, even including the creation of a counter-transformation political block.

In this article, we attempt to establish the existence of a normative-value dissonance at both the micro and macro levels (cf. Hechter 1993: 5). As already mentioned, the dissonance at the micro level exists if a substantial number of people display discord between the normative framework of their activity and their internalized value patterns. In this sense, the dissonance is recognized, for example, if a considerable number of people employed in the private sector (which essentially required their acceptance of the market normative framework) support redistributive-collectivist values, and also if a fairly large number of employees in the nontransformed state sector manifest pronounced liberal value orientations (professionals, for instance). At the macro level, normative-value dissonance may be expressed in two ways: as the sum of individual dissonances at a group (class) level, or as a value (ideological etc.) split between the social groups (primarily classes), where one group (or more) reveals predominantly a normative-value consistency within one pattern of social life reproduction, while the other(s) displays the same kind of harmony within another pattern (situations that are typical under conditions of the existing, or potential, change of social relations). The problem of dissonance becomes particularly serious when basic social relations are changing and the social elites fail to reach a fundamental value consensus. By mobilizing different population groups in their internal conflicts, parts of the elites may produce wider antagonistic social conflicts and thereby substantially slow down, and even block ongoing social changes. We will attempt to confirm the existence of such circumstances in Serbia on the basis of our research findings.

Our study analyzes the spread of dominant value orientations among the classes in the present postsocialist system in Serbia, based on data collected within the South-East European Social Survey Project (SEESSP) conducted in December 2003 and January 2004, using a sample of 2,997 respondents. The analysis focuses on two pairs of contrasting value orientations: political liberalism vs. authoritarian collectivism and market liberalism vs. redistributive statism. Obviously, these are fundamental value orientations linked with opposed institutional-normative patterns of the socialist and capitalist societies, that is, with the hypothetical emergence of normative-value dissonance in the period of transformation from the former social system to the latter, which is currently under way in Serbia. We check interclass value consistency and assess the influence of potential value-normative dissonance on the further democratization and market transformation of Serbia. We compare these with those of a previous survey on the Change in Class Structure and Mobility in Serbia, carried out on a sample of 3,660 respondents in 1989. Our decision to address these two value orientations is empirically based on the results of factor analysis of several statements hypothetically linked with different value systems.
and has been confirmed by principal component analysis, as presented below. These results will then be used to form scales (composite indexes) representing political and market liberalism, on one side, and authoritarian collectivism and redistributive statism, on the other. In the third step of this exercise we use ANOVA on the scale scores to describe the value consistency between and within social classes as well as between and within the private and state sectors.

We define class as the role of a group in the reproduction of a given system of social relations. Classes form a social hierarchy based on structural differences in the possession of economic, organizational, and cultural capital, which make their relations potentially conflicting. At the same time, classes are internally complex, divided into subgroups of individuals who share similar life conditions. In this way, we consider class structure to be simultaneously relational and hierarchical. In our survey classes were operationalized by the respondents’ positions in social reproduction, indicated by size and type of capital—economic (E), organizational (O), and cultural (C)—he/she commands, creating a hierarchy of seven groups: (1) large and medium entrepreneurs, higher and medium managers, politicians (large E and/or O); (2) small entrepreneurs, lower managers (medium E and/or O); (3) professionals, self-employed (with university degree—attorneys, medical doctors, etc.; small E and/or O, and high C); (4) nonmanual employees, self-employed (with secondary education; without or small E and O, medium C); (5) skilled manual workers (without E and O, small C); (6) unskilled nonmanual employees (without E, O, and C); and (7) small farmers (negligible E, without O and C).

The bearer of the class position is the household, and the dominance approach is used, which means that households are assigned the class position of their highest ranked members. Pensioners and the unemployed who previously had jobs were assigned class positions based on their former employment. The permanently unemployed, housewives, and students were classified according to their partner’s position if married, or, if unmarried, according to their father’s or their child’s position living in the same household.

Survey Results

Change of Value orientations in 1989–2004

While comparing the results obtained in 2004 with those of 1989 the analysis will remain descriptive because both of the value orientations examined in the overall samples may be shown with only two statements each. Political liberalism vs. authoritarian collectivism will be presented with the following statements:

1. Total freedom of speech today leads to the disorganization of society.
2. In the end, the judicial system must serve the authorities.

Market liberalism as opposed to redistributive statism will be measured through the following statements:
1. The less the government intervenes in the economy, the better it is for Serbia (2004); the state today must have a greater role in managing the economy (1989).

2. The interests of the collective must always precede those of individuals.

Table 1 shows the scores for the above-mentioned statements, broken down by strata, comparatively for 1989 and 2004. The direction of statements is always set in such a way that the higher scores indicate a more liberal view. 

*T*-testing reveals a statistically significant difference in the scores of overall samples for both statements, while score values indicate an increase in political liberalism in 1989–2004 (see Table 2). Observed by strata and for both statements in both years it is possible to note an almost linear distribution, that is, if the positions of the small entrepreneurs and professional strata are switched, we obtain a distribution wherein the increase of social position is accompanied by a deflection from authoritarian collectivism, with the additional exception of small farmers (for an explanation see note 18 below). An increase in the score is seen in all but the top stratum, where the first statement registers a drop and the second stagnation. This fact could be explained first, by the already fairly high score of this stratum.

### Table 1

Scores on Statements Measuring Political Liberalism/Authoritarian Collectivism, by Strata, Comparatively for 1989 and 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>3.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>3.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>3.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>3.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>3.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>3.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>3.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Strata: 1—large and medium entrepreneurs, higher and medium managers, politicians; 2—small entrepreneurs, lower managers; 3—professionals, self-employed (with university degree—attorneys, medical doctors, etc.); 4—nonmanual employees, self-employed (with secondary education); 5—skilled manual workers; 6—unskilled nonmanual employees; 7—small farmers.
(close to 4), and second, by the fact that a more noticeable shift could hardly be expected in a period dominated by authoritarian rule.

Here again t-testing points to a statistically significant difference in the acceptance of the examined statements in 1989 and 2004, but the average score values for the overall sample indicate a slight increase in market orientation. The scale’s midpoint was reached only in the case of the attitude valuing government intervention in the economy in 2004. With these statements linear distribution by strata is difficult to identify both because the farmers demonstrated a greater inclination toward the free market than the workers did (as could be expected) and the fact that the scores for both statements were fairly even in all strata in 2004. Particularly interesting is the finding that in 2004 the managerial and professional strata, in contrast to others, manifested greater support for state intervention in the economy than they did in 1989. Several explanations for this outcome are possible. In the first place, in 1989 the free market (in Serbia as well as elsewhere in the period following the collapse of socialism) was embraced in an ideological-utopian (uncritical) manner, especially among the more educated social groups, while the practical experience of market transformation brought about a more realistic view of relations between the state and the market (for the same processes in the Czech

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>3.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>2.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>3.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>2.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>3.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>3.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Strata: 1—large and medium entrepreneurs, higher and medium managers, politicians; 2—small entrepreneurs, lower managers; 3—professionals, self-employed (with university degree—attorneys, medical doctors, etc.); 4—nonmanual employees, self-employed (with secondary education); 5—skilled manual workers; 6—unskilled nonmanual employees; 7—small farmers.
Republic see Vecernik <<should this be Večernik?>> and Mateju 1999: 193). Along with increased skepticism, in the case of professionals, this could also be attributed to their interest in preserving their positions, since 65 percent of them were employed in the state sector. On the other hand, bearing in mind that over 90 percent of the managerial strata operate in the private sector, the change of position in their case could instead be assigned to their practical experience with the well-known transition dilemma, according to which Serbia needed a strong state more than a weak one. The following analysis provides an expanded insight into these matters.

Value Orientations in 2004

This section focuses on the tendency of social strata toward political liberalism/authoritarian collectivism, that is, market liberalism/redistributive statism, in 2004. In the first step of the analysis, more than thirty statements were subjected to factor analysis in order to identify the grouping trend. The two value orientations analyzed in this text were clearly distinguished. Out of these two factors, several statements with the lowest scores were removed, leaving seven statements in each. The following statements were selected to represent political liberalism vs. authoritarian collectivism:

1. Without leaders every nation is like a man without a head.
2. Total freedom of speech today leads to the disorganization of society.
3. In the end, the judicial system must serve the authorities.
4. The most important thing for children to learn is to obey their parents.
5. The media should have more understanding for the authorities.
6. The media that do not care about national interests should be banned.
7. The interests of the collective must always precede those of individuals.

Market liberalism vs. redistributive statism was measured using the following statements:

1. The government should take measures to reduce income disparities.
2. Privatization functions in theory, but not in practice.
3. Income disparities in Serbia are too large.
4. The government is responsible for reducing the difference in receipts of those with high and low incomes.
5. The government should provide jobs for all who want them.
6. The government should guarantee a minimum living standard to all.
7. The state should intervene in the economy to reduce inequalities and protect the poor and the weak.

These statements were subjected to principal components analysis (PCA). In the case of political liberalism/authoritarian collectivism the first component explains 40 percent of the variance, while in the case of market liberalism/redistributive
Furthermore, the attitudes were recoded to give the statements the same direction, whereby the higher score on the 1–5 scale means a higher degree of political or market liberalism. The statements were then used to form scales. Reliability analysis shows a high coherence of the scale. For the scale of political liberalism/authoritarian collectivism alpha is 0.74, and for the scale of market liberalism/re-distributive statism, 0.75. Midpoint on both scales is 21. The average for the overall sample on the scale of political liberalism/authoritarian collectivism is 19.2, thus a bit below the midpoint of the scale. The fact that respondents from the sample did not move above the scale midpoint reconfirms the conclusion of the previous section that over the past fifteen years Serbia has not made enviable progress in the transformation of social values. This slow progress may be explained by the above-mentioned long-term effects of the traditionalist cultural heritage, which became amalgamated with the socialist value system and thus (along with the contingent historical factors of civil wars and international isolation) helped the authorities in power to retain their positions during the 1990s. Another important factor here is the composition of the scale itself, which comprises more attitudes explicitly manifesting authoritarianism and collectivism than liberalism.

The results obtained through the analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the distribution of the above-mentioned value orientations within the social strata reveal a statistically significant difference in the spread of political liberalism between the strata ($f = 144.692$, significance = 0.000). The following gives the results of the post hoc analysis as well as average index values by strata and the distances between them, that is, the tendency of the strata to group in this respect (see Table 3).

<Table 3>

All groupings of the strata are statistically significant. The order of the strata by scores on the scale of political liberalism is not linear. Although the farmers form a separate subgroup with the lowest score, we could say that they are linked with the strata of higher and lower manual workers by the score that is below midpoint on the scale. The intermediate stratum and the small entrepreneurs stratum are about the midpoint, while the professionals and groups at the top of the social hierarchy are somewhat above the midpoint. The linearity is essentially disrupted by the fact that in terms of their acceptance of the authoritarian-collectivist values the sector of small entrepreneurs is closer to the intermediate stratum than to the ruling group or the professionals. Education, to all appearances, has the largest influence on the scores of this scale, since the most educated strata show the least inclination toward authoritarian-collectivist values (although we must not forget that they, too, barely exceed the scale’s midpoint), as opposed to the strata with the lowest education and the traditional way of life. Only 23 percent of respondents in the small entrepreneurs stratum have university degrees (15 percent have graduated from elementary school, or have not completed formal education), which, education-wise, makes them closer
to the intermediate strata, where secondary education prevails.

As for the values characteristic of the free market and private ownership, the situation is substantially worse than in the sphere of political liberalism. On the scale of market liberalism/redistributive statism (see Table 4), the average for the overall sample is 13.4, far below the midpoint of the scale (21). Just as in the previous case, the main explanation for this is found in the coupling of historical-cultural factors (remarkably delayed modernization, which did not bring about a more substantial breakthrough of market economy in Serbia before the end of World War I, and even then only to be abolished by the socialist command economy) and still more strongly manifested current historical processes (after more than a decade of extreme exhaustion of an already backward economy, reforms in this sphere are very difficult and painful). But, here again the composition of the scale itself has some influence on the scores. Namely, the scale largely consists of statements expressing egalitarianism, which has deep historical and structural roots in Serbian society.

The analysis applied to social strata gives $f = 37.190$ and significance = 0.000. In this case, the value of the $f$-statistic is substantially lower than in the case of political liberalism/authoritarian collectivism, but the statistical significance points to a substantial difference in the strata’s scores on the scale of market liberalism/redistributive statism. The results of post hoc analysis are also given for this scale.

---

Table 3

Results of Tukey’s HSD Test for the Scale of Political Liberalism/Authoritarian Collectivism for Seven Strata, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strata</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>16.6127</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.5527</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18.4461</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20.2796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21.1824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22.2523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22.6225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.898</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Strata: 1—large and medium entrepreneurs, higher and medium managers, politicians; 2—small entrepreneurs, lower managers; 3—professionals, self-employed (with university degree—attorneys, medical doctors, etc.); 4—nonmanual employees, self-employed (with secondary education); 5—skilled manual workers; 6—unskilled nonmanual employees; 7—small farmers.
in order to see the grouping of the strata.

The grouping of the strata is statistically significant and almost completely linear, in the sense that the degree of economic liberalism grows with an increase in social position. At the bottom of the scale, unskilled workers are somewhat more egalitarian than farmers, which is to be expected in view of the private-ownership status of the latter. Actually, bearing in mind that skilled workers represent a link between the first two groups derived in post hoc analysis, one could say that all strata hierarchically lower than the professionals form a powerful egalitarian block. However, the distance between the groups is not sufficiently large for any of them to reach at least the midpoint of the scale. Even the stratum of political managers and large entrepreneurs, mainly supports the principle of redistribution and state intervention in the economy. Thus, it is obvious that the economic elite in Serbia has not yet become sufficiently strong to pull away from state protectionism, and, in the value sphere, to show a resolute commitment to the market economy. This finding doubtlessly indicates the existence of a pronounced normative-value dissonance at the social macro level, in view of the fact that intensive changes of legal and other regulatory frameworks as well as the proclaimed economic policies of reform governments have, over the past few years, reinforced the increasingly consistent institutional basis of the market economy.

In order to verify the existence of the normative-value dissonance at the micro
level, we compare the scores on both value scales of those employed in the private sector with those of state sector employees. For that purpose we will leave out farmers from the former category, since their work remains dominated by self-sufficiency and an orientation toward state regulation, while production for the free market is still marginal. Before we present the results we should note the absence of bias produced by the concentration of particular strata in specific ownership sectors, except for the fact that the shares of unskilled workers and professionals are somewhat more pronounced in the private and state sectors, respectively.

Here ANOVA shows a statistically significant difference between the scores of private and state sector employees on the scale of political liberalism/authoritarian collectivism ($f$-statistic 37.19, significance 0.000). However, since the average score in the social sector is 19.43 and in the private sector 20.51, we may still conclude that political liberalism is fairly equally (and more than moderately—if we recall that the midpoint of the scale is 21!) spread in both sectors.

Analytical findings for market liberalism/redistributive statism are similar, thus also indicative of major problems in the transformation of values as well as in the entire cultural makeup of Serbian society. Specifically, although ANOVA results point to a statistically significant difference ($f = 22.36$, significance 0.0000), this difference is actually minimal. The scores of state and private sector employees on this scale are 13.25 and 13.89, respectively. This allows us to conclude that normative-value dissonance exists on both the macro and micro levels and that the support of actors operating within the normative framework of the private economic sector for egalitarianism and state influence in the economy is not substantially lower than that of employees of state firms and institutions.

Thus, the problem appears at three levels. First, although the political-economic elite, small entrepreneurs, and professionals (as main transmitters of value and ideological orientations) demonstrate a lower inclination toward redistributive statism than other do strata, their acceptance of the institutions and ideas of the free market, gradually introduced and widely promoted, is too weak to systematically produce the forms of actions that would lead to a faster consolidation of the new system. To this we should add the orientation toward actions characteristic of “political capitalism” manifested by part of the economic elite during the process of slow and incomplete privatization (Arandarenko 2000). Second, even private sector employees (still fewer in Serbia than their state sector counterparts) do not manifest a firm belief in the principles on which their firms operations are based. Third, the redistributive-statist value pattern of an important part of the elite finds its structural partner in a large number of workers employed in the impoverished and ruined state firms. On the other hand, these employees, as well as small entrepreneurs endangered by large competition and weak markets, in parallel with the strict regulative norms prescribed by the state, are often oriented toward the informal economic sphere in order to eke out their existence. This kind of normative-value dissonance creates conditions where, in parallel with the proclaimed and even institutionalized rules, an entirely different economic sphere of operations
develops—a world of corruption, gray economy, protectionism, clientelism, and tax evasion—which substantially slows down the process of social transformation in Serbia.

**Conclusion**

In the domain of the political liberalism/authoritarian collectivism value orientation, the existence of a pronounced normative-value dissonance has been established, with a somewhat lower intensity at the social macro level, in view of the visible structural split between the upper and lower parts of the social scale. A serious problem in this case is the fact that liberally oriented higher and middle strata barely exceed the arithmetic mean of the scale. This reveals a strong presence of values opposed to the emerging institutional-normative social-political context (parliamentary pluralism, human rights, etc.) within the social groups that are proponents of the transformation. This is why the consolidation of the democratic order in Serbia inevitably encounters major obstacles.

Speaking of market liberalism as a value orientation, we think it is important to specifically emphasize a number of phenomena. First, we should note that within the economic subsystem in Serbia we still have the intertwining of several normative frameworks that define the actions of society’s members. Slow and insufficiently widespread privatization, delayed restructuring or closure of large state firms, and high unemployment create conditions for the existence of three parallel economic systems and their respective rules of conduct. In the first system, firms are organized on the basis of private capital and essentially operate according to the rules of a regulated market. The second system generally functions following, by inertia, the previous socialist command system, now transformed into a state-regulated system, wherein the efficiency of production and profit-making are subordinated to the redistributive principle and passivity. Finally, many unemployed, many poor employees (including professionals), and a large number of self-employed and small entrepreneurs carry out a good part of their economic activities in informal and occasionally illegal economic relations, in line with unwritten, but fairly strictly observed, rules of behavior, which belong to neither of the previously mentioned systems and actually impair their stabilization. This system may best be defined as a wild market.

In view of this intertwining of three normative systems in the Serbian economy, it is not surprising that the survey has established an inconsistent mixture of market liberalism and redistributive statism among the members of different social strata. We have thus registered the existence of a normative-value dissonance at the macro level with a large number of private sector employees and small entrepreneurs who support redistributive statism, and also among members of the managerial strata who, although in a group where liberal values are the most widespread, in a series of individual cases share beliefs contrary to the officially proclaimed economic policy objectives.
Finally, the previous insights point to the absence of value consolidation in the part of Serbia’s social structure that could act as the backbone of the new economic system, which by itself induces a normative-value dissonance at the macro level. The change of value orientations of a larger part of the population is possible only if new institutional arrangements and the relevant normative frameworks take a firmer hold, which, again, is possible only if the new elite, the entrepreneurs, and the middle class—as mediators of value patterns—widely accept the corresponding values. At this point, this is not the case either in the economic or political subsystems in Serbia. The identified pronounced normative-value dissonance here thus confirms Dahrendorf’s old inference that cultural changes lag behind institutional changes, which, in turn, slows down changes in “firm” social substructures and makes their direction uncertain.

Notes

1. For a comprehensive analysis of these specific characteristics in the first period of (blocked) transition, cf. Lazić (2000a).

2. In social sciences, values have traditionally been primarily related to the existing system of social relations—cf., for example Parsons (1971). However, we stress the dual—systemic and historical—origin of values, for reasons that will soon become obvious!

3. It is clear that some “inconsistency” between norms and values is always present in complex social systems, for different reasons, primarily because of the aforementioned historical roots of certain value patterns and opposing group interests. Historical “input” in value formation has been clearly demonstrated empirically in Inglehart, Basanez, and Moreno (2001: 14–19). See also Inglehart (1997: 92–100).

4. This phenomenon, in relation to the postsocialist countries, was long referred to by Dahrendorf, who famously remarked that changes in the cultural subsystems of Central and East European countries will take substantially longer than those of (institutional and normative) political and economic natures.

5. Together with Parsons, we “distinguish analytically between the structural level and the value level (cultural level)” (cf. Fuchs and Roller 1998: 39). However, in the situation of systemic change, further differentiations—between (new and old, dominant and not-yet-suppressed, conflicting) structures, normative orders, and value systems—are also analytically indispensable.

6. Different perspectives concerning the problem of value change—mostly at the individual level—are discussed in Hechter, Nadel, and Michod (1993).

7. Concerning the theoretical framework for our study of Serbian “deviation” from the prevailing transformation model, we prefer “cultural” over “rational choice” analysis, since we agree with Duch that “rational choice models are more likely to predict continuity in the transition from non-democratic to democratic regimes” (Duch 1998: 195).

8. For structural homology of command (socialist) institutional and normative patterns and traditional norms of the peasant society, see Lazić (1994). It should be kept in mind that the traditional-command basis of distributive norms and egalitarian values in Serbia has been historically and structurally different from the redistributive norms and corresponding values characteristic of the “social-market subtype” of capitalist system. On the differences among “national systems of political economy”—Anglo-Saxon, Japanese, “Social-market,” and so on, models—see Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997); see also Gilpin (2001).

9. On some empirical insights into the existence of dissonance within the group of liberally oriented economic actors in Serbia during the past few years, see “The Socio-Economic
Culture of Contemporary Serbia,” *Sociologija* 45, no. 3 (2003).

10. See detailed analysis of different aspects of recent economic transformation in Serbia in *Ekonomski anali* (Ekonomskata tranzicija u Srbiji 2006).


12. Empirical relations between the new institutional system and value change in eleven Central and East European postsocialist countries are analyzed in Barnes and Simon (1998). However, the authors limited the research to “congruence” between the political subsystem and democratic values. Of course, their conceptual framework (partly) differs from ours, so that, for example, they speak about differences between formal and informal rules (39), while we introduce the problem of duality of structures. The specific course of (blocked) transformation in Serbia, in comparison with mostly “successful” transitions in Central European countries, makes this conceptual difference understandable.

13. We take the term “organizational” capital from Wright (1985: 88; he uses the term “asset” instead of capital), to signify the position of a group inside the process of decision making, in political as well as in economic hierarchical structures.

14. On the discussion of relational and gradational models of class approach, see Crompton (1993).

15. On the criteria for the operationalization of classes and the division of the four basic classes in Serbian society into seven strata, cf. Lazić (1994: 55–84) and Lazić and Cvejić (2005). The seven strata may be collapsed into classes as follows: the ruling class (group 1), the middle class (groups 2 and 3), transitory stratum (group 4), manual workers (groups 5 and 6), and farmers (group 7). It is easy to see that the main difference between our “class schema” and Goldthorpe’s approach is to be found at the top of social structure: we separate professionals from the ruling class and put them into the middle class (together with small proprietors and lower managers). We consider economic and organizational capital as still representing the basis for the reproduction of contemporary capitalist social relations, with education playing a supporting role. Obviously, the position of routine nonmanual workers has to be below the position of the middle class according to all three criteria. On Goldthorpe’s class schema, see Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 28–47).


17. We should note that in the circumstances marked by strong nationalist homogenization (characteristic of both years), the respondents could interpret the first statement not only in the economic but also in the political sense.

18. It should be borne in mind that throughout the socialist period farmers in Serbia retained private ownership of their small land holdings.


20. This naturally does not apply to small entrepreneurs concentrated in the private sector.

References


